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The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) decides strategically on preliminary references in mat-
ters of access to social benefits by economically inactive EU migrants, and to 
what extent national courts decide to comply with ECJ preliminary rulings in 
these issues. In doing so, this paper attempted to contribute to a better under-
standing of judiciaries’ impact on public policy through the EU preliminary 
reference procedures. Knowing that the field of social policy is highly conflict-
laden, this paper assumes that the ECJ activity in this area will largely reflect 
a strategic balancing between deeper EU integration through case law and 
respect for national (fiscal) interests and competences. The paper draws on 
an intergovernmental, rational-choice theoretical perspective and applies it 
in a case study on Germany, where three cases (Dano C-333/13, Alimanovic 
C-67/15 and García-Nieto C-299/14) regarding the access to social benefits 
(i.e. special non-contributory benefits) have recently been referred to the ECJ. 
To draw conclusions, the author traces political circumstances, previous ECJ 
case law, ECJ reasoning in the case studies and final verdicts by national 
courts.
Keywords: EU migrants, social benefit systems, European Court of Jus-
tice, preliminary references, Alimanovic, Dano, García-Nieto.
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INTRODUCTION1
Freedom of movement of European 
Union (EU) citizens and access to the so-
cial security system of host countries has 
become a hotly debated political issue in 
the EU lately, especially in the wake and 
aftermath of the Brexit vote. Fears that EU 
citizens from “new’’ member states might 
be migrating to other EU member states 
in order to take advantage of more gener-
ous social benefit systems are widespread. 
Absurdly, the current political debate does 
not center only around so-called ‘’welfare 
tourists’’2, but also includes propositions 
to extend exclusion periods from the so-
cial security system (i.e. in-work benefits) 
to EU migrant workers3 and to cut back 
on their dependents’ rights4 (i.e. childcare 
benefits). Interior ministers (Austrian, Ger-
man, Dutch and British) have been writing 
letters5 to the Council presidency in 2013 
asking for “practical measures to address 
the pressures placed on...social welfare 
systems’’. Although a fact-finding report 
by the European Commission (2013) found 
that the reasons to migrate are predomi-
nantly work- and family-related, the hype 
surrounding benefit misuse is unswerving.
This paper looks into preliminary ref-
erences to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in regard to the access to welfare 
benefit systems of host member states. The 
main interest of the paper lies in ECJ’s and 
national courts’ behavior in a salient and 
very sensitive policy area of EU law. The 
literature seems to neglect the behavior of 
national courts in the aftermath of ECJ’s 
preliminary rulings and fails to bring for-
ward nuanced, policy area related theories. 
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to in-
vestigate to what extent the ECJ decides 
strategically on preliminary references 
in a salient policy issue – access to social 
benefits by EU migrants, and to what ex-
tent national courts decide to comply with 
ECJ preliminary rulings in these issues. 
Since the field of social policy is highly 
conflict-laden, this paper assumes that the 
ECJ activity in this area should be the one 
most likely to display a strategic balancing 
between more integration through case law 
and respect for national (fiscal) interests 
and competences. The paper uses an inter-
governmental, rational-choice theoretical 
perspective (Garret, 1995) and applies it in 
a case study on Germany where three cas-
es, Dano C-333/13, Alimanovic C-67/15 
and García-Nieto C-299/14), have been re-
cently referred to the ECJ regarding the ac-
cess to German basic provision benefits (a 
special non-contributory benefit). It traces 
political circumstances, previous ECJ case 
law, ECJ reasoning in the case studies and 
final verdicts by national courts to draw 
conclusions.
The paper continues as follows: the first 
section develops an actor-centered theo-
retical framework to study the preliminary 
reference procedure, followed by a short 
description of political, legislative and ju-
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dicial developments in EU social security 
policy. The second section brings forward 
two hypotheses with regard to ECJ and na-
tional court rulings in the preliminary refer-
ence procedure. The third section describes 
the methodology and the fourth section 
continues with a case study on Germany. 
Before concluding, the fifth section ana-
lyzes the key findings.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As a supranational institution, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) has been con-
sidered as one of the engines of European 
integration (Pollack, 2003: 156). The com-
petences to conduct constitutional review 
(Article 263 TFEU) respond to preliminary 
references by national courts (Article 267 
TFEU) and decide on financial sanctions 
for infringement of EU law (Article 260 
TFEU) which opens a wide array of pos-
sibilities to influence EU policy-making 
and transposition of EU law into domestic 
policies. 
The impact of ECJ preliminary rulings 
is under special scrutiny in this article. The 
process starts by national judges referring 
questions (preliminary references) to the 
ECJ, which then issues an interpretation of 
EU law by means of judgment, that is, a 
preliminary ruling. Ideally, the judgment 
should provide a useful interpretation of 
the dispute in the referred case. In practice, 
however, the ECJ does not eschew sug-
gesting a final determination of the case at 
hand. One does not have to think hard to re-
alize the importance of studying ECJ case 
law. For instance, the landmark ruling in 
the 1979 Cassis de Dijon case6 established 
the principle of mutual recognition, which 
became one of the bedrock principles of 
the European single market. Scholars have 
sought to trace the influence of preliminary 
6  Cassis de Dijon C-120/78 (1979).
rulings both on EU policy-making and 
on the national level. Wasserfallen (2010: 
1133) argued that the ECJ influences Euro-
pean integration once its rulings are taken 
up in the EU policy-making process and 
incorporated into new EU legislation. On 
the other hand, Nyikos (2003) analysed 
how preliminary rulings are implemented 
by national courts and found that in more 
than 96 percent of cases ECJ decisions 
were successfully implemented. Besides 
these sporadic undertakings, the field lacks 
more theorizing on the effects of ECJ pre-
liminary rulings. In specific, research has 
failed to explain negative national court 
responses - instances where national courts 
do not implement ECJ decisions or rein-
terpret ECJ rulings according to their own 
interpretation of law. Although courts’ non-
compliance is allegedly rare, we still have 
little knowledge about the reasons why 
national courts do not fully cooperate in 
some cases. Does it happen in sensitive, 
crucial cases where national prerogatives 
are at stake, and where the risk of placing 
significant social and economic burden on 
the state is too high? Crucially, one has to 
remember that under the preliminary refer-
ence procedure the ECJ is not granted the 
right to decide on the conformity of nation-
al policies with EU law. This is reserved for 
the infringement procedure. It only ought 
to interpret EU law, but not intermeddle in 
factual matters in a preliminary reference 
(Davies, 2012: 78-9). Effectively, this gives 
national courts full authority to refute or ig-
nore the ECJ’s interpretation of evidence in 
a specific case (ibid).
Two distinct theoretical approaches 
shed some light on the role of national 
courts, one neofunctionalist (Mattli and 
Slaughter, 1995) and the other intergovern-
mentalist (Garret, 1995). The former ac-
knowledges ECJ’s activist role and argues 
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that it has pursued European integration 
and its own institutional interest, and at the 
same time resisted national social and eco-
nomic interests. On the contrary, it is argued 
that the preliminary reference procedure 
has opened up the possibility to influence 
policy areas where “the treaty is vague or 
legislation is absent or incomplete’’ (Hix, 
2005: 136). According to this view, Article 
267 and the doctrines of supremacy and di-
rect effect have actually co-opted national 
courts and empowered7 them to decide on 
issues that have traditionally been beyond 
the scope of their activities (Stone Sweet, 
2010: 29). The latter approach introduces 
the strategic government perspective, 
claiming, first, that ECJ rulings take into 
account strategic interests of individual 
states and hence try not to run against eco-
nomic interests of the member state; and 
second, that member states have remedies 
to counter adverse effects of ECJ’s actions. 
For instance, they might seek to overrule 
decisions by passing new EU legislation 
(Conant, 2002: 192), preempt ECJ influ-
ence by modifying domestic provisions 
or simply proceed by not complying or 
transposing legislation only to a limited 
extent (Heidlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; 
Blauberger, 2012; Panke, 2007: 849). It is 
reasonable to assume, in this approach, that 
national courts would act as buffer-zones 
between the ECJ and national governments 
in instances where the ECJ rulings have se-
rious implications for the future of a policy, 
in the sense of placing too high a burden 
(adaptational, financial or administrative) 
on the nation state. On the other hand, 
rather than being buffer-zones, an alterna-
tive perspective might suggest that national 
courts strategically use the preliminary ref-
erence procedure (by deciding to refer or 
not to refer cases to the ECJ, by dictating 
which questions are posed to the ECJ etc.) 
as an additional leverage to challenge of-
ficial government policy.
The following section takes stock of 
the rational choice assumptions in the in-
tergovernmentalist approach and tries to 
come up with tentative scope conditions as 
to when national courts are to be expected 
to thwart ECJ preliminary rulings. The sec-
tion focuses on EU social security policy 
and builds two hypotheses.
OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL, 
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
DEVELOPMENTS
Social policy is one of the first policy 
areas to have been coordinated at the EU 
level, but at the same time, it remains one 
of the most contested. The governance of 
access to social benefits of a host member 
state for EU migrant workers, job-seekers 
and non-active EU citizens is regulated 
through EU regulation on the coordination 
of social security systems (EC 883/2004), 
making it the only social policy falling un-
der “hard coordination’’ (Copeland and 
ter Haar, 2015: 201). Sindberg Martinsen 
(2015) identifies three phases of EU social 
integration: negative social integration, 
positive social integration and the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). Already 
the Rome Treaties of 1958 featured anti-
discrimination rules and the principle of 
freedom of movement for workers. With-
out a formal social policy title, these early 
provisions had in mind the proper func-
tioning of the internal market and aboli-
tion of nationality-based discrimination in 
work matters. The treaty provisions called 
for coordination of national social security 
systems to ensure transferability and aggre-
gation of workers’ benefits in host Member 
7  See Weiler’s (1991) ‘’judicial empowerment’’ thesis.
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States (Article 48 TFEU). Other formal 
competencies of the EU to engage in social 
regulation followed only later (positive in-
tegration) in order to mitigate social prob-
lems generated by market forces. Legisla-
tive competencies fall into three areas of 
social regulation: standards for health and 
safety of workers, working conditions, and 
equal treatment at the workplace (Falkner, 
2017: 274). Still, in other social fields such 
as social protection, welfare provision, 
wages and employment policy, Member 
States retain policy-making responsibili-
ties, whereas the EU encourages coordina-
tion through soft law (OMC).
Member States have traditionally con-
ditioned access to national welfare sys-
tems by nationality requirements (Pen-
nings, 2012: 308). With Council Regula-
tion 1612/68 laying down the rights of EU 
migrant workers, and Council Regulation 
1408/71 specifying access to social se-
curity benefits for EU migrant workers, 
Member States were forced not to discrim-
inate between nationals and EU migrant 
workers, both regarding contributory and 
non-contributory social security schemes8. 
Social assistance9, on the other hand, was 
exempt from the provisions. Labor short-
age was a driving force for more integra-
tion in this field, and concerns about equal 
treatment of EU migrants and their fami-
lies were therefore only of pragmatic na-
ture. Additionally, migrant workers were 
allowed to export10 these benefits to other 
member states. However, the right to trans-
fer benefits prompted legal disputes and 
political responses. In the Frilli11 case, the 
ECJ argued that Belgium could not restrict 
non-contributory guaranteed income for 
older persons to Belgian nationals only. In 
another case12, the ECJ ruled in favor of an 
Italian national who, upon returning home 
from France after retirement, requested a 
means-tested pension from France. France 
persistently refused to comply, sparking 
a political debate at the EU level. Finally, 
Member States unanimously voted in the 
Council to amend13 Regulation 1408/71 
by means of introducing a list of so-called 
‘’special non-contributory benefits’’14, ex-
empting these from exportability.
This legislative overrule was followed 
by the introduction of the European citizen-
ship concept in the Treaty of Maastricht, 
extending the right to move and reside free-
ly within the territory of the EU Member 
States (Article 20 TFEU), and prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
regard to provisions in the Treaty (Article 
18 TFEU). However, this right to ‘’move 
and reside freely’’ comes with strings at-
tached in the form of ‘’limitations and con-
ditions’’ referred to in Article 21(1) TFEU. 
Again, ECJ case law was crucial in speci-
fying how the relationship between free 
movement of EU citizens and their access 
to social benefits should be interpreted. In 
8  Article 4, paragraph 2, Council Regulation 1408/71.
9  Initially, the difference between social assistance and social security was vague in the Regulation 1408/71. Case 
law clarified that social assistance refers to benefits where eligibility is determined via ‘’individual assessment such 
as means testing’’ (Conant, 2002: 180).
10 The exportability of social benefits meant that EU migrant workers were not required to reside in the host 
country in order to receive the benefit (for instance, pensions), but could have them ‘exported’ to another member 
state.
11 Frilli C-1/72 (1972).
12 Giletti et al. C-381/85 (1987).
13 Council Regulation 1247/92.
14 Those benefits ‘’because of its personal scope, objectives and/or conditions for entitlement, have characteristics 
both of the social security legislation...and of social assistance’’ (Council Regulation 883/2004, Article 70(1)). They 
are supplementary, substitute or ancillary in securing a minimum subsistence income. (ibid., Article 70(2)(a)(i)).
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Martinez-Sala15, the ECJ, for the first time, 
successfully invoked Article 18 in a judg-
ment on access to child-raising allowances 
for an unemployed Spaniard living in Ger-
many. The right to move and reside freely 
was then codified in secondary law with the 
Citizenship directive16, laying down princi-
ples of equal treatment in matters pertain-
ing to social benefits. Non-active citizens 
were allowed to reside freely in a member 
state for up to three months, and could not 
access social assistance during that period 
(Article 24(2)), but could prolong resi-
dence to more than three months under the 
condition of having ‘’sufficient resources’’ 
to provide for them and their family, and 
not becoming ‘’a burden on the social as-
sistance system of the host Member State’’ 
after examining personal circumstances 
on a case-by-case basis (Article 7(1(b))). 
However, it was agreed that expulsion 
cannot be an automatic consequence of re-
questing social assistance (Article 14(3)). 
Furthermore, legislation on the coordina-
tion of social security systems was updated 
with Regulation 883/2004. The main pur-
pose of this legislation is to guarantee equal 
treatment of EU migrants within the social 
security system of the host country in mat-
ters related to a variety of social security 
branches (Article 3(1)). However, the regu-
lation does not apply to social and medical 
assistance schemes.
The ECJ, although opening up social 
assistance benefits17, student maintenance 
grants18, and benefits to facilitate labor mar-
ket access19 to economically inactive work-
ers, remained cautious to apply the prohi-
bition of discrimination unconditionally. In 
each case, the literature agrees, the judici-
ary attempted to ‘’strike a fair balance’’ 
between individual rights and the financial 
interests of member states, that is their 
welfare systems (Verschueren, 2014; Was-
serfallen, 2010). To be eligible for welfare 
benefits, non-active EU migrants should 
not become an unreasonable burden to 
public finances (Grzelzyck), should display 
a genuine link with the labor market of the 
host country (Collins; Vatsourus & Koupa-
tantze) or should showcase ‘’a certain de-
gree of integration’’ into the society of the 
host country (Bidar). The balance seems 
to reflect the awareness of the high politi-
cization of the field, instances of legisla-
tive overrule and incomplete transposition 
in a policy deemed to display ‘’contained 
compliance’’ (Heidlmaier and Blauberger, 
2017: 2; Conant, 2002) as a frequent politi-
cal response to judicial activism.
From what has been said, EU legal 
scholars agree that, in the early phase of 
EU social policy, ECJ case law has promot-
ed social integration and individual social 
rights, and that the ECJ has acted as a mo-
tor of integration in the field of social policy 
as well (Heidlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; 
Horsley, 2013: 931; Stone Sweet, 2011; 
Weiler, 1994). To some authors, ECJ’s in-
terpretive power even amounts to a ‘quiet 
revolution’ (Weiler, 1994: 517). The ECJ 
has helped in building and sustaining EU 
citizenship rights in regard to non-discrim-
ination, gender equality and welfare rights.
Hypotheses
This short description of judicial and 
political responses to EU citizens’ access to 
social benefits also indicates that the coor-
15 Martinez-Sala C-85/96 (1998).
16 Directive 2004/38 of the European parliament and the Council.
17 Grzelcyk C-184/99 (2001).
18 Bidar C-209/03 (2005).
19 Collins C-138/02 (2004), and Vatsouras & Koupatantze C-22/08 (2009).
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dination of social security systems is a po-
litically sensitive and salient area in which 
Member States bear the costs of judicial ac-
tivism. It also seems that the judiciary is re-
luctant to impose significant financial bur-
den on national welfare systems so as not to 
provoke national governments’ discontent 
and legislative retaliation. Moreover, rul-
ings in ECJ case law indicate a potentially 
dangerous development with proliferation 
of ambiguous concepts such as ‘’genu-
ine links’’, ‘’unreasonable burdens’’ and 
‘’certain degree of integration’’, offering 
national governments a carte blanche to 
arbitrarily define conditions on a case-by-
case basis. This in turn has the potential to 
add another layer of ‘’legal uncertainty’’ in 
the sphere of EU migrants’ access to social 
benefits (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014: 2). 
This article shares the opinion of a group of 
scholars who claim that the ‘’environment 
for the CJEU as an engine of integration has 
changed severely’’ (Werner, 2016: 1450). 
The European project, especially follow-
ing the Treaty of Maastricht, has become 
increasingly politicized, the public vis-
ibility of EU activities has increased, and 
the integration process is facing opposition 
from Eurosceptic forces. In that regard, 
ECJ’s activist behavior in the social sphere 
has fallen victim to the ‘end of honeymoon 
phase, as Weiler (1994) calls it. The rest of 
the article will examine three recent cases 
in which the ECJ had to construct a pre-
liminary ruling on issues of social benefit 
access to EU migrants. The assumption is 
that the unfavorable socio-economic en-
vironment in the EU (following the Euro 
crisis, migration crisis, and sovereign debt 
crisis) will act as a deterrent to ECJ activ-
ism. Social policy, currently being a politi-
cally sensitive field that implies high (re-) 
distributive effects, offers the perfect case 
to test the constrained action thesis of ECJ 
activity in the field. Contrary to the view 
of an activist judiciary, this article adopts 
a ‘constrained court view’, according to 
which ECJ’s interpretive autonomy is con-
strained by political and economic condi-
tions in the immediate environment. In oth-
er words, this follows an intergovernmental 
logic (Cotter, 2017:12) in which the ECJ is 
expected to be responsive to the interests 
and preferences of economically and po-
litically powerful Member States. It will 
act with much ‘self-restrain’ (Sindbjerg 
Martinsen, 2015: 5). The Court operates 
in an environment in which both national 
courts and governments have sufficient 
room for maneuver to disregard or counter 
an adverse preliminary ruling. How are na-
tional courts supposed to react according to 
this perspective? If the intergovernmental, 
‘constrained’ view is to hold true, national 
courts should readily accept an ECJ ruling 
that does not impose new budgetary obli-
gations on the Member States or implies a 
significant shift in national responsibilities.
Based on the aforementioned devel-
opments, and drawing on rational-choice 
institutionalism, the following hypotheses 
are formulated:
H1: In the areas of social policies that 
are regarded as sensitive in national capi-
tals, and in which expansive ECJ interpre-
tations have potentially high budgetary 
implications on national welfare systems, 
ECJ case law will strategically shy away 
from such interpretations.
H2: In ECJ preliminary rulings that 
balance between individual and state in-
terests, national courts will not reinterpret 
or refuse to implement the ruling, but will 
comply with the judgment instead.
METHODOLOGY
The empirical part of this paper will 
present a case study of Germany concern-
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ing three ECJ preliminary ruling on access 
to basic provision benefits by economi-
cally inactive EU migrants (including job-
seekers) - the Dano case20, the Alimanovic 
case21 and the García-Nieto case22. Con-
cerning case selection, Germany was cho-
sen as a potential crucial case (Gerring, 
2006: 115) that has the highest potential to 
elucidate the theoretical assumption of this 
paper. As it will be shown, the three cases 
were politically highly controversial even 
beyond the German context. They were to 
signal the sentiment of the Court toward 
future case law on matters of EU citizen-
ship, more specifically in this case on the 
access to social benefits by EU migrants in 
general. Furthermore, for Member States 
an unfavorable ECJ ruling might have a 
great potential to distort national policies 
towards EU migrants. Hence, drawing on 
the intergovernmental and rational choice 
tradition, Germany will be regarded as a 
most-likely case to display ECJ’s reluc-
tance to act excessively activist in politi-
cally-laden and salient policy issues, and 
national courts’ hesitance23 to run against a 
ECJ ruling where the finding balances be-
tween individual and state interests or does 
not go against the interest of the national 
government.
The paper uses process tracing24 (see: 
Stone Sweet, 2010) to identify and disen-
tangle national governments’ positions, 
characteristics of the policy field, the gen-
eral political and societal debate surround-
ing the cases, ECJ’s rulings on the indi-
vidual cases and the reactions to the rulings 
both at the level of national judiciary and 
political and societal actors. Process-trac-
ing is a within-case method that ‘’attempts 
to identify the intervening causal process 
– the causal chain and causal mechanism 
– between an independent variable (X) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable 
(Y)’’ (George and Bennet, 2005 in: Beach 
and Pedersen, 2013: 1). Here, the mecha-
nismic understanding of causality implies 
that the researcher unveils the black-box of 
causality and studies the complex ‘’system 
of interlocking parts that transmits causal 
forces from X to Y’’ - causal mechanisms 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 29). This way, 
observable implications of the proposed 
theoretical assumptions will be traced, 
and conclusions will be drawn based on 
the theoretical-empirical fit. Since causal 
mechanisms cannot directly be observed, 
we look for observable implications, which 
are ‘‘case-specific predictions of what ob-
servable manifestations each of the parts of 
the mechanism should have if the mecha-
nism is present in the case’’ (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013: 14). They refer to predict-
ed empirical evidence that can be derived 
from a theory (Rohlfing, 2013: 609). In that 
sense, attention will be paid to the percep-
20 Dano C-333/13 (2014).
21 Alimanovic C-67/15 (2015).
22 García-Nieto  C-299/14 (2016)
23 At this point, it should be noted that a critical reader would expect national courts not to be referring cases to 
the ECJ in the first place, if the assumption was to hold truth. However, I argue that the general climate of judicial 
uncertainty and individual assessment that has marked the field leaves national courts clueless on how the ECJ will 
interpret EU’s primary and secondary law in this matter. Since it is not reasonable to expect overly activist judgments 
in social benefit cases, I argue that national courts could not be guided by heuristics in regard to ECJ’s reactions, and 
therefore would not shy away from preliminary references.
24 A disclaimer is needed here. This paper does not pretend to use process tracing in the methodologically 
nuanced and rigorous fashion proposed in social sciences these days (see Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Rohlfing, 
2013). In ideal terms, process-tracing would track causal mechanisms leading to certain outcomes, and make use of 
comparative hypothesis testing to discern uniqueness and certainty of observable implications for each hypothesized 
causal pathway. This piece uses the concept more loosely.
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tions of national (fiscal) interests, ECJ’s 
reasoning and national courts’ responses. 
An explicit reference in the ECJ ruling to 
the potential fiscal burden that an expan-
sive interpretation might cause will be re-
garded as highly confirmatory evidence. 
This evidence would boost our confidence 
in the validity of the hypothesis, but failure 
to find explicit reference would not critical-
ly undermine our confidence (smoking gun 
test). Instances where national courts’ final 
verdicts would run against state interests, 
whilst laying down an explicit individual-
rights based reasoning, will be considered 
as discomforting evidence for hypothesis 2. 
This would annul confidence in the valid-
ity of the hypothesis (hoop test). Partially 
following Nyikos (2003), national courts’ 
responses in this paper will be coded as 
full compliance, reinterpretation25 of the 
ruling or non-implementation. The data in-
cludes official documents, reports, govern-
ment opinions, newspaper excerpts, expert 
opinions and secondary literature. These 
sources form the basis for identifying ob-
servable implications. Figure 1 displays 
the basic causal chain that builds on previ-
ously explicated theorization (see above). 
The shaded boxes include the hypothesized 
behavior by the ECJ (H1) and national 
courts (H2) in conflict-laden circumstances 
in which the political elite and the general 
political climate are disinclined towards 
additional fiscal burdens.
25 Reinterpretation refers to instances where the national court modifies the final verdict compared to the ECJ 
ruling, but still acknowledges the validity of the ECJ ruling (Nyikos, 2003: 407).
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CASE STUDY – GERMANY
Germany had a rich history of defying 
EU law on social policy and denouncing 
ECJ interference, especially during the Kohl 
administration in the early 1990s26. Most of 
the contemporary controversy, however, 
revolves around access to social benefits 
by economically inactive EU migrants and 
their dependents. The issue gained public 
attention with high post-accession immi-
gration from Romania and Bulgaria, and 
the popular fear that they might misuse 
the German welfare system. Discussions 
on ‘’welfare tourism’’ were further accen-
tuated by the fact that EU migrants gain 
immediate access to child benefits27 in Ger-
many (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014: 5). 
As a result, the association of German cit-
ies (Deutscher Städtetag) issued a position 
paper expressing concern with the financial 
and societal challenge these migrants pose 
to municipalities, and requesting action on 
the states’, federal and EU-level (Associa-
tion of German Cities, 2013). A number of 
parliamentary hearings were held on the 
issue of EU migrants. Moreover, a Com-
mittee of State Secretaries (Staatssekretär-
sausschuss) was created to come up with 
solutions to challenges in the social secu-
rity system. In a 2014 interim report, the 
Committee pledged to speed up financial 
support to burdened communities and sug-
gested stricter residence requirements for 
job-seekers (German Government, 2014). 
When in 2005 the notorious Hartz IV28 
Act became effective, German labor mar-
ket policies shifted radically (Kemmer-
ling and Bruttel, 2006: 96). What previ-
ously consisted of (contribution-based and 
income-related) unemployment benefits, 
and (tax-financed and means-tested) unem-
ployment assistance and social assistance, 
was now transformed into Unemployment 
benefit I, which is income-based and lim-
ited to 12 months, and Unemployment 
benefit II, effectively merging unemploy-
ment assistance and social assistance into 
one system – the basic provision benefit29, 
independent of former income and fixed 
at €345 per month. Former workers who 
used to receive income-related and unlim-
ited unemployment assistance, were now 
granted a fixed, almost equally (un)gener-
ous allowance as the former social assis-
tance. The purpose of the basic provision is 
to cover subsistence costs and to facilitate 
employment. EU law recognizes the Ger-
man basic provision benefit as a special 
non-contributory benefit. It is namely the 
access to these basic provision benefits that 
was discussed in the Dano case, the Ali-
manovic case and the García-Nieto case. 
Germany had a vested interest in contain-
ing access to social benefits to inactive EU 
migrants precisely because such action 
would risk fuelling fiscal and political ten-
sion. In all of the three cases, the German 
government submitted an official opinion 
to the ECJ along with a number of other 
Member States who opposed an expansive 
reading of EU migrants’ social rights. From 
a process-tracing perspective, the described 
26 See Conant (2002) and Panke (2007).
27 “Union fordert strengere Kindergeld-Regeln für EU-Ausländer’’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 May 
2014. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/europa-wahlkampf-kindergeld-fuer-
eu-auslaender-12921353.html, and: ‘’Kindergeld für EU-Ausländer kostet Milliarden’’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  11 May 2014. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/sozialleistungen-
kindergeld-fuer-eu-auslaender-kostet-milliarden-12934386.html. Accessed on: January 3 2017.
28 Officially called ‘’Act for Modern Services on the Labour Market’’ (Viertes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen 
am Arbeitsmarkt).
29 Originally called “Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende’’.
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intensity of opposition within the realm of 
German politics offers sufficient proof that 
the first link in the causal chain (see Fig-
ure 1) was indeed present – the political 
climate was extremely unfavorable in the 
run-up to the ECJ rulings due to fiscal and 
political concerns raised on multiple levels 
of German political institutions.
The Dano case
The Dano case was referred to the ECJ 
by the German Social Court in Leipzig 
and it concerned a dispute between two 
Romanian nationals – Elisabeta Dano and 
her son Florian who were granted an un-
limited residence permit in Germany, and 
the Jobcenter Leipzig. Ms Dano was eco-
nomically inactive and did not seek em-
ployment in Germany, but applied for the 
basic provision benefit twice. Her request 
was declined twice by the Jobcenter Leip-
zig. The Jobcenter drew on provisions in 
the German social code which deny ac-
cess to social assistance to foreign nation-
als who reside in Germany with the ‘’sole 
purpose of obtaining assistance or search-
ing for employment’’ (§23(3) Sozialgesetz-
buch XII). In a nutshell, the Social Court in 
Leipzig asked the ECJ whether 1) Article 
4 of the Regulation 883/2004 on the coor-
dination of social security systems, which 
established a principle of equality of treat-
ment between nationals and EU migrants, 
and whether 2) Article 18 and Article 20 
of the TFEU regarding EU citizenship and 
non-discrimination, applied in the cases of 
persons who request special non-contribu-
tory benefits under Regulation 883/2004. 
In short, the ECJ ruled that Ms Dano could 
not resort to the principles of equal treat-
ment and non-discrimination as laid down 
in the Citizenship directive and Regula-
tion 883/2004 (paragraph 83). The Court 
argued that, under Article 7(1)(b) of the 
Citizenship directive, EU citizens who are 
economically inactive, such as Ms Dano, 
could reside in another Member State for 
longer than three months only on the condi-
tion of having sufficient resources so as not 
to become an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system. This way, the ECJ 
made full recourse to Article 21(1) TFEU 
which indicates that the right of inactive 
EU nationals to reside freely in another 
Member State is bound with fetters. For 
them, residing in another Member States 
is not unconditional and is ‘’subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in the 
Treaty and by the measures adopted for its 
implementation’’. The Citizenship direc-
tive prescribes in that regard that residence 
for inactive EU migrants is conditioned by 
having ‘’sufficient resources for themselves 
and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of 
the host Member State during their period 
of residence and have comprehensive sick-
ness insurance cover in the host Member 
State’’ (Article 7(1)(b)). The Court em-
ployed a broad interpretation of ‘’social 
assistance’’, subsuming Dano’s request 
for special non-contributory social benefits 
within the meaning of ‘’social assistance’’ 
set within the Citizenship directive. Under 
EU law (Article 70, Regulation 883/2004), 
it is solely the Member States’ competence 
to specify conditions for access to special 
non-contributory cash benefits – therefore, 
these conditions do not constitute EU law. 
The Court accepted Member States’ right 
to refuse social benefits to non-active EU 
migrants who do not have sufficient re-
sources to satisfy the terms of a residence 
claim (paragraph 78). Hence, the implica-
tion was that applying for basic provision 
signals insufficient resources to provide for 
oneself and therefore preempts any non-
discrimination claims by virtue of not ful-
filling the “sufficient resources’’ condition 
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to reside freely under the Citizenship direc-
tive. Still, the ECJ requested individual/
case-by-case assessments of the financial 
situation of each person concerned (para-
graph 80).
The German Social Court in Leipzig 
implemented the ECJ ruling without any 
further ado, and the long-awaited decision 
was welcomed by German politicians30 and 
the media31 alike. The judgment was hailed 
outside Germany as well, notably amongst 
conservative MEP’s32 and the British con-
servatives. David Cameron called the deci-
sion ‘’simple common sense’’33 as he was 
encouraged by the judgment to urge for ad-
ditional curtailing of social benefit rights to 
EU migrants amidst the scheduled referen-
dum to leave the EU.
The Alimanovic case
In December 2013, the German Federal 
Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) made a 
request for a preliminary ruling in the dis-
pute between Jobcenter Berlin Neuköln and 
Nazira Alimanovic and her three children, 
all Swedish nationals34. Ms Alimanovic and 
her daughter Sonita were temporary em-
ployed between June 2010 and May 2011. 
Afterwards, they were both paid basic pro-
vision for job-seekers under German Social 
Code between December 2011 and May 31 
2012, after which the Jobcenter withdrew35 
the benefits. The referring court asked 
whether the principle of equal treatment in 
Article 4 of the Regulation 883/2004 was 
breached. The ECJ first noted, referring to 
the judgment in Dano, that the benefits at 
issue (Unemployment benefit II for job-
seekers) do constitute social assistance36, 
and are not meant to ‘’facilitate access to 
the labor market’’ (paragraph 46). It also 
recalled on the conclusions in Dano that 
equal treatment is applicable only when 
the EU migrant is a lawful resident. Under 
EU law37, Ms Alimanovic and her daughter 
had the right to retain the status of a worker 
for at least six months after employment, 
and have access to social assistance for at 
least six months38. They did so, but were 
denied entitlements after the expiration 
date. Therefore, in the opinion of the Court, 
the Member State had the right to rely on 
Article 24(2) in the Citizenship directive to 
30 “EuGH-Urteil zu Hartz IV: Europa bleibt offen - mit Einschränkung’’, Der Spiegel, 11 November 2014. Available 
at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/hartz-iv-eugh-urteil-zur-sozialhilfe-staerkt-europa-a-1002291.html. 
Accessed on: January 8 2017.
31 “Freizügigkeit, die sie meinen’’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 February 2015. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.
de/wirtschaft/sozialleistungen-fuer-eu-buerger-freizuegigkeit-die-sie-meinen-1.2333680. Accessed on: January 9 
2017.
32 “EU judges rule against ‘welfare tourists’ in nod to Cameron’’, Euractiv, 12 November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/social-europe-jobs/eu-judges-rule-against-welfare-tourists-nod-cameron-309929. 
Accessed on: January 9 2017.
33 ‘’EU ‘benefit tourism’ court ruling is common sense, says Cameron’’, BBC, 11 November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30002138. Accessed on: January 9 2017.
34 They were all granted permanent residence in Germany in 2010.
35 In December 2011, the German government used its right under international law to issue a ‘’reservation’’ 
to the application of the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (1953) concerning basic provision 
benefits under the second book of the German Social Code (paragraph 4). This change had an effect on the decision 
made by the Jobcenter to withdraw benefits in the Alimanovic case.
36 In the opinion of the Court, social assistance in that sense refers to ‘’all assistance schemes...to which recourse 
may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and those of his 
family.’’ (paragraph 44).
37 Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38.
38 This was confirmed in judgments in Vatsouras & Koupatantze C-22/08 and C-23/08).
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deny access to social assistance during the 
first three months of residence and longer 
to EU migrants residing in Germany for the 
sole purpose of seeking employment (para-
graphs 57-8). Still, unlike the Dano case, 
the Court ruled that in the cases where resi-
dence places unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the state, ‘’no...
individual assessment is necessary in cir-
cumstances such as those at issue’’ before 
adopting expulsion measures (paragraph 
59) since it is believed that the period in 
which Ms Alimanovic retained the status 
of a worked added to ‘’a significant level 
of legal certainty’’ (paragraph 61). Hence, 
Ms Alimanovic could be expelled without 
a proportionality test.
The ECJ judgment was seen in the me-
dia as a logical extension to the Dano judg-
ment39. The final verdict40 by the Federal 
Social Court (FSC) in the Alimanovic case 
was, however, announced in December 
2015. The FSC resorted to a reinterpreta-
tion of the case. Although reiterating ECJ’s 
judgment that EU migrants without resi-
dence permit have no claim on basic pro-
vision under the German Social code, this 
allegedly does not exclude them from all 
types of social assistance, hence they do 
have a right to social assistance (Sozial-
hilfe) as laid down in the 12th book of the 
Social Code (SGB XII)41, after a six-month 
residence period (so called ‘’solidified resi-
dence’’). EU migrants would effectively 
become eligible for social assistance after a 
period of ‘’solidified residence’’. The FSC 
relied in its verdict on a judgment by the 
German Federal Court (GFC) in 2012 on 
the undeniable right of asylum seekers to 
a ‘’fundamental right to a humanely exis-
tential minimum42’’. It also found the Eu-
ropean Convention on Social and Medical 
Assistance applicable where possible, but 
only in regard to subsistence help (Leb-
ensunterhalt) under the 12th book of the 
German Social Code. The divergence from 
the ECJ ruling was received with a mixture 
of great surprise in the media43, confusion 
among professionals44, and anger among 
municipalities45 who are to bear the finan-
cial burden of providing social and health 
assistance to EU migrants. What remained 
obscure at that time was in which form the 
social and medical assistance was to be 
granted and whether it could only be grant-
ed for an interim period before deportation. 
This unusual situation in which on the one 
hand, the ECJ judgment was in line with 
the government’s expectations, and on the 
other the final verdict of the FSC engaged 
in a reinterpretation, sparked further po-
litical controversy. Some lower courts, mu-
39 “Grundsatzurteil: EuGH entscheidet über Hartz IV für EU-Ausländer’’, Der Spiegel, 15 September 
2015. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/hartz-iv-fuer-eu-auslaender-grundsatzurteil-
erwartet-a-1052812.html. Accessed on: January 10 2017.
40 Alimanovic B 4 AS 43/15 R (2015).
41 According to §23 paragraph 1 of the German Social Code (SGB XII), access to subsistence assistance, 
assistance in course of sickness, pregnancy, maternity or care, is dependent only on ‘’factual residence’’.
42 Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees human dignity to every 
person unconditionally.
43 “Am Minimum’’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 December 2015. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/
urteil-am-minimum-1.2766265. Accessed on: January 16 2017.
44 “Minimalleistungen auch ohne Aufenthaltsrecht’’, Legal Tribune Online, 4 December 2015. Available at: 
http://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/bsg-urteil-b4as4415r-sozialleistungen-eu-buerger-ohne-aufenthaltsrecht/. 
Accessed on: January 16 2017.
45 “Milliardenkosten durch Sozialhilfe für EU-Ausländer?’’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 December 2015. 
Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/milliardenbelastung-fuer-staedte-und-kreise-
durch-sozialhilfe-fuer-eu-auslaender-13949002.html. Accessed on: January 16 2017.
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nicipalities and districts (who are the com-
petent authorities for SGB XII benefits) 
decided to actively ‘contain the influence 
of ECJ jurisprudence by not implement-
ing the FSC judgment and denying access 
to benefits’ (for an overview: Heidlmaier 
and Blauberger, 2017: 16-17). The Ger-
man government could not let this instance 
of ‘outright non-compliance’ (Blauberger, 
2012: 111) become the new normal, and it 
decided to break the legal uncertainty by 
revising the social legislation roughly one 
year after the FSC judgment. According 
to the new rules, EU citizens who migrate 
to Germany and have no right to benefits 
under Book II of the German Social Code, 
cannot become eligible to long-term social 
assistance under Book XII during the first 
five years. They would nonetheless be en-
titled to a temporary benefit of a maximum 
duration of one month to facilitate the exit 
from the country (FMLSA, 2016).
The García-Nieto case
In the García-Nieto case (C-299/14), the 
Higher Social Court of the State of North 
Rhine-Westphalia sent a request for a pre-
liminary ruling to the ECJ on 17 June 2014 
on a proceeding between the Employment 
Centre for the district of Recklinghausen 
and the Peña-García family – all Spanish 
nationals. The Employment Centre had 
refused to issue a basic provision benefit 
under Book II of the German Social Code. 
Ms García-Nieto and Mr Peña-García lived 
together in Spain, but never married. After 
joining Ms García-Nieto and her daughter 
in Germany, Mr Peña Cuevas and his son 
applied for subsistence benefits. Mr Peña 
Cuevas did not work, and living expenses 
were covered by Ms García-Nieto’s salary. 
At the time Mr Peña Cuevas applied for 
the subsistence benefit, he was residing in 
Germany for less than 3 months, which, ac-
cording to the Book II of the Social Code, 
automatically disqualified both him and his 
son from entitlement. The first question 
that was referred to the ECJ on whether the 
special non-contributory benefits of Regu-
lation 883/2004 fall within the scope of the 
equal treatment principle in the same regu-
lation largely resembled the question pre-
viously asked in the Dano case. Since the 
Court answered affirmatively to that ques-
tion, the second question applied, asking 
whether the principle of equal treatment 
in special non-contributory benefits can be 
limited by Article 24(2) of the Citizenship 
directive which allows the host country to 
deny access to social assistance to inactive 
EU migrants during the first three months of 
residence. The Court found that, similar to 
the Dano and Alimanovic cases, the mean-
ing of special non-contributory cash ben-
efits (the basic provision) also constitutes 
‘social assistance’ (Para 37). Having estab-
lished the relationship between the Citizen-
ship directive and Regulation 883/2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems, 
the Court ruled that Germany has the right 
to deny entitlement to those benefits to 
non-German EU citizens (Para 53). It was 
concluded that Mr Peña Cuevas lawfully 
resided in the territory of Germany, as no 
conditions apply to residence for the period 
of up to three months (Para 42). However, 
Member States can rely on the derogation 
in Article 24(2) of the Citizenship directive 
which gives them the right not to issue so-
cial assistance during the first three months 
of EU migrants’ residence (Para 43).
The Higher Social Court of the State 
of North Rhine-Westphalia accepted and 
implemented the ECJ preliminary ruling. 
Legal commentators of recent cases (Croci, 
2016; Haag, 2016; Kramer, 2016) agree 
that the García-Nieto judgment largely 
confirms previous restrictive interpreta-
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tions from Dano and Alimanovic which 
now de facto and de jure confine social citi-
zenship to inactive migrant EU citizens.
ANALYSIS
Recently, the Council of the European 
Union discussed amending Regulation 
883/2004 on the coordination of social se-
curity systems in the light of the recent ECJ 
ruling (COREPER, 2017). Member States 
discussed how to codify case law (“in full, 
partially or not at all’’) on access to social 
benefits by economically inactive EU mi-
grants. The fact that Member States could 
not agree on a compromise solution on how 
to codify this case law, and that it was de-
cided not to codify it, only illustrates how 
contested the issue of access to social ben-
efits in host Member States is. Countries 
that are net-recipients of EU migrants and 
that have more generous welfare systems 
would generally be on the losing side of a 
more liberal interpretation of EU migrants’ 
social rights. This is why, in general, the 
three ECJ judgments were welcomed in 
those Member States. In contrast to social 
integration activism of previous decades, 
the ECJ has in recent years established 
a restrictive understanding of both free 
movement rights and rights to access a 
host Member State’s welfare system. The 
Dano, Alimanovic and García-Nieto have 
solidified this trend that virtually erects a 
wall between economically inactive EU 
migrants and host countries’ welfare sys-
tems. Once regarded a pioneer in develop-
ing a “doctrine of EU social citizenship’’ 
(Heidlmaier and Blauberger, 2017: 4), 
the ECJ has now engaged in a “roll back 
of decades of citizenship construction’’ 
(O’Brien, 2016: 938). To fully understand 
the extent to which the ECJ has shaped the 
understanding of entitlement of non-active 
EU migrant citizens to social assistance, 
two aspects of the ECJ reasoning need to 
be observed – one related to the meaning 
of special non-contributory benefits and 
the other to the application of the freedom 
of movement principle. With regard to the 
former, the ECJ had to establish the scope 
of meaning of the ‘social assistance system’ 
concept referred to in Article 7(1)(b) of the 
Citizenship directive. According to Arti-
cle 7(1)(b), non-active EU citizens could 
reside in another Member State for more 
than 3 months only if they had “sufficient 
resources for themselves and their family 
members not to become a burden on the so-
cial assistance system of the host Member 
State…’’. In all three of the German cases, 
the benefit under dispute was a ‘basic pro-
vision benefit’. This measure has a dual 
character according to German law – on the 
one hand, to facilitate access to the labour 
market, and on the other, to enable a life 
in dignity. According to EU social security 
coordination law, this measure constitutes 
a so-called special non-contributory ben-
efit. By definition, these types of benefits 
have “a dual character between social ‘se-
curity’ and social ‘assistance’…’’ (Sindb-
jerg Martinsen, 2015: 88), being both a tool 
for covering subsistence costs financed 
through general taxation, and a measure 
to ease integration into the labour market. 
In all three judgments, the ECJ contended 
that the meaning of social assistance can 
be extended to the basic provision benefit. 
This is not surprising given the history of 
the dispute over special non-contributory 
benefits. Owing to governments’ concerns, 
a list of special non-contributory benefits 
was drawn and inserted in the social se-
curity coordination regulations to prevent 
exportability of such benefits, as Member 
States insisted on the principle of territori-
ality to be applied. Knowing how political-
ly laden this issue was, the ECJ opted for a 
broad understanding of social assistance in 
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the three cases. This reasoning was based 
on a previous judgment in the Brey case 
(C-140/12) in which the ECJ asserted that 
the concept of social assistance “must be 
interpreted as covering all assistance intro-
duced by the public authorities…that can 
be claimed by an individual who does not 
have resources sufficient to meet his own 
needs and the needs of his family’’ (Para 
61). The same case has anchored the prob-
lem over access to social assistance into the 
freedom of movement debate and the right 
of residence. In the Brey case, as well as in 
the three German cases, the ECJ used Di-
rective 2004/38 (Citizenship directive) to 
establish the right of residence, on the out-
come of which it then depends whether the 
individual is entitled to equal treatment in 
respect to social assistance. Each time the 
ECJ rejected requests for social assistance 
with reference to Article 7(1)(b) of the 
Citizenship directive. Passing the residence 
requirement has grown into a watershed 
for social assistance claims by non-active 
EU citizens migrating to another Member 
State.
The first hypothesis, that the ECJ pre-
liminary rulings in social benefit issues 
would avoid placing high financial burden 
on member states, but rather leave ample 
room for maneuver to national authori-
ties, was confirmed in all three cases. As 
described in the previous section, “welfare 
tourism’’ became a hot topic in Germany 
and the rest of Europe and could hardly be 
overseen by ECJ judges46. It is reasonable 
to assume that the Court acted strategi-
cally and did not want to add fuel to the 
fire, hence it continued balancing between 
individual claims and national core compe-
tences. The fact that the Court put forward 
a broad definition of social assistance47, 
applying the residence requirement of the 
Citizenship directive to special non-con-
tributory benefits in Regulation 883/2004, 
indicates a tendency not to intimidate 
national governments. From a process-
tracing point of view, strong confirmatory 
evidence was found which suggests that 
the ECJ had a high regard for budgetary 
concerns in Germany. In all three cases, the 
ECJ explicitly reasoned that residence con-
ditionality serves the purpose of preventing 
economically non-active EU migrants from 
becoming an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host coun-
try, and that any other conclusion would 
run against the purpose of the Citizenship 
directive (Dano, Para 74; Alimanovic, Para 
50; García-Nieto, Para, 39). This evidence 
is the smoking-gun that confirms the ECJ’s 
intention with the restrictive interpretation 
of EU law was to insulate national wel-
fare systems from “any abuse or excessive 
pressure’’ (Croci, 2016). This confirms the 
expectations that the ECJ will be a con-
strained actor operating with “current polit-
ical and financial circumstances in Member 
States’’ (Haag, 2016) in mind.
The second hypothesis was, however, 
not confirmed. Although in the Dano and 
García-Nieto cases the domestic court 
readily accepted ECJ’s interpretation of 
EU law, in Alimanovic the Federal Social 
Court deflected from the preliminary rul-
ing. In process-tracing, such evidence is 
considered to be strongly disconfirming in 
respect to the hypothesized claim which 
crucially compromises our confidence that 
national courts will adjudicate with gov-
ernmental interests in mind. It seems that 
the developments in the field cannot be 
successfully explained by an intergovern-
mental, rational-choice inspired approach. 
46 Which is not the same as saying that the judges were pressured to come up with a certain kind of decision, but 
were rather aware of the political climate and the balance of competences in matters of social benefits for migrants.
47 Initially in Brey C-140/12 (2013).
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FSC’s reinterpretation of the ECJ ruling in 
the Alimanovic case counteracts the interest 
of the national government, thus suggest-
ing that factors other than strategic calculus 
guide national judges in EU law disputes. 
Interestingly, the FSC decided to uphold 
the German constitutional value of life in 
dignity, suggesting that the domestic legal 
culture might have guided the final verdict. 
Besides these cultural/institutional factors, 
the preferences and value systems of indi-
vidual judges could also inform the deci-
sion to reinterpret an ECJ preliminary rul-
ing (cf. Davies, 2012: 85). 
Three sets of conclusions can be drawn 
from this case study in regard to ECJ rul-
ings and their domestic application in sen-
sitive policy areas. Firstly, the ECJ has 
continued to deliver not overly activist 
judgments in the cases concerning EU mi-
grants’ access to the social benefit system 
of member states. The ECJ has been care-
ful not to outstep its competences and has 
firmly reinforced Member States’ exclu-
sive competence to determine individual 
circumstances of applicants for social ben-
efits. The Court has in no instance granted 
an unconditional right to equal treatment, 
but made sure to leave enough leeway for 
Member States to interpret what consti-
tutes “sufficient resources’’, “unreason-
able burden’’, “genuine links’’ or ‘’genu-
ine chance’’ when determining outcomes 
of residence and benefit claims. What may 
be considered as establishing ‘’legal un-
certainty’’ in a strictly juristic sense, might 
also be considered strategic behavior on 
the side of the Court so as not to intimidate 
national sovereignty and fiscal capacities, 
limit the caseload before national courts 
and the ECJ, or even spark legislative ret-
ributions on the EU level. Still, by uphold-
ing fundamental principles of freedom of 
movement and leaving enough room to 
challenge restrictive policies of access to 
benefits by EU migrants, the ECJ was able 
to balance between the interests of individ-
uals and national governments. This devel-
opment is in line with intergovernmentalist 
expectations that the ECJ will act in a self-
constraining manner in salient policy areas 
with shared competences. The ECJ could 
not escape noticing the political and soci-
etal reactions to the perceived consequenc-
es of EU migrants’ access to host countries 
social benefit systems. Therefore, the ECJ 
interpreted EU law sufficiently broadly48 
as to leave enough room for maneuver to 
member states to govern access to benefits 
relatively autonomously. 
Secondly, the Alimanovic case dem-
onstrates that the role of national courts 
in preliminary reference procedures is not 
static, and that ECJ rulings are not simply 
absorbed into the domestic level. On the 
contrary, national courts display enough ju-
dicial power to reinterpret ECJ judgments 
and significantly alter domestic policies 
even in very sensitive areas. Opposite to 
expectations, the FSC employed an activ-
ist interpretation of EU migrants’ right to 
benefits, upholding the most fundamental 
principle of the German legal order – hu-
man dignity. The decision of the German 
Federal Court (GFC) to upgrade the ECJ 
ruling by adding one more safety net to 
EU migrants and by drawing both on ob-
ligations under international law and case 
law can hardly be explained by the theo-
ries of legal integration in European Stud-
ies or by inter-judicial conflict. From both 
standpoints, an initially activist and pro-
48 Most notably by linking residence requirements to access to special non-contributory benefits, and qualifying 
them as “social assistance’’ as written in the Article 24(2) derogations to the principle of equal treatment in the 
Citizenship directive so that a link between the Citizenship directive and Regulation 883/2004 was established 
(Verschueren, 2014: 165).
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integrationist ECJ judgment is taken for 
granted – a development that was not found 
in this case study. One possible explanation 
of FSC’s behavior is that EU law indeed 
broadened the ‘’menu of policy choices’’ 
for the judiciary (Stone Sweet 2010:30). 
Since the FSC might have predicted a cau-
tious ruling by the ECJ, it could utilize the 
preliminary ruling to form the basis of the 
final and more nuanced verdict. A second, 
more plausible explanation would indicate 
that national legal norms, culture and in-
ternational obligations do not simply van-
ish as a result of supremacy and the direct 
effect of EU law. Unlike any strategic, 
rational-choice explanation, this sociologi-
cal notion would expect national courts to 
stick to fundamental principles of the do-
mestic legal culture when implementing 
EU preliminary rulings. This is consistent 
with FSC’s reliance on GFC’s case law, but 
more profoundly in the reliance on the prin-
ciple of ‘’human dignity’’ enshrined in the 
German Basic Law. Hence, the GFC up-
held one of the cornerstones of the German 
legal order. Finally, we might be witness-
ing a new development in the preliminary 
reference procedure in salient policy areas 
with shared competences. As some authors 
indicate (Verschueren, 2014; Verschueren, 
2015; Zahn, 2015), ECJ case law49 regard-
ing social benefits increased legal uncer-
tainty and widened the ‘’margin of discre-
tion’’ to national authorities (i.e. automatic 
expulsion in Alimanovic). National courts 
could therefore act as guardians of legal 
certainty and additionally reinterpret ECJ 
rulings so as to close the gap of legal uncer-
tainty. In addition to the Alimanovic case, 
this explanation is corroborated by the Brey 
case50 where the Austrian Supreme Court 
supplemented the ECJ ruling on a com-
pensatory supplement (Ausgleichzulage) 
by adding that the right to equal treatment 
under EU law in regard to non-contributory 
social benefits applies as long as the com-
petent Austrian authorities do not decide to 
terminate the residence right.
Thirdly, and somewhat contrary to the 
second point, national courts will still have 
to adjudicate with the government in mind 
since the government could make recourse 
to a variety of instruments to defy an unfa-
vorable ECJ/national court ruling. If faced 
with expansive ECJ interpretations, Mem-
ber States can still obstruct a proper imple-
mentation of a ruling or investigate possi-
bilities of revising domestic legislation in 
a manner that would not contradict EU law 
(Blauberger, 2012: 113). The German au-
thorities exploited the opportunity offered 
by a series of favorable ECJ preliminary 
rulings to overturn FSC’s reinterpretation, 
and revised social legislation so to solidify 
the barriers to entering the social assistance 
system for the citizens of other Member 
States. In effect, governments may circum-
vent the national court system and cherry-
pick an ECJ ruling they wish to implement 
unilaterally. 
CONCLUSION
This paper attempted to contribute 
to the literature on judicial influence on 
public policy through the EU preliminary 
reference procedures in the field of access 
to social benefits. The recent activity of 
the ECJ in preliminary rulings on social 
rights of economically inactive migrant 
EU citizens reflects a deferential approach 
towards national political and economic 
(fiscal) interest. The gap in social rights 
between active and inactive EU migrants 
has widened, hence intensifying economic 
stratification, class differences and so-
49 I.e. Grzelzcyk, D’Hoop, Collins, Bidar, Brey, Dano, Alimanovic etc.
50 For a detailed account and legal analysis of the Brey case, see Verschueren (2014).
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cial exclusion (see: Bruzelius et al., 2017; 
Heidlmaier and Blauberger, 2017; Blan-
chet, 2016; O’Brien, 2016). The article 
hypothesized from an intergovernmental 
perspective on a policy issue with a long 
history of judicial-political contestation, 
contained compliance, legislative overrule 
and preemption. Even though the expecta-
tions of a cautious ECJ approach to issues 
of access to social benefits were met in 
Dano, Alimanovic, and García-Nieto alike, 
reactions of the German Social Court in the 
Alimanovic case do not match the assump-
tion about non-activist judicial behavior 
in sensitive policy matters. Both the Ger-
man and Austrian court did not challenge 
the ECJ rulings, but reinterpreted them in 
a more human rights-based direction that 
runs against the perceived interests of the 
national government, and possibly has 
wider implications for the application of 
the policy at issue. 
The findings are an important reminder 
that the domestic legal culture and adher-
ence to key principles (i.e. human dignity) 
can significantly alter the course of pre-
liminary rulings or diminish/increase its 
impact. As long as the elements of the final 
verdicts are compatible with the supremacy 
and direct effect doctrines, and they do not 
counter the ECJ ruling, one cannot talk of 
non-implementation, but rather reinterpre-
tation of the ruling in line with domestic le-
gal traditions. A further policy implication 
of domestic courts’ activism in EU matters 
is that lax and broadly interpretable EU law 
on EU migrants’ access to social benefits is 
not a guarantee that domestic competences 
and authority will stay intact by ECJ pro-
ceedings in all cases. At times, depending 
on domestic circumstances and legal tradi-
tions, we may expect national courts to be 
the missing link that, on the one hand, over-
comes ECJ’s reluctance to apply exces-
sively activist interpretations in case law 
on important matters, and on the other hand 
establishes legal certainty in these matters. 
Having said that, the preliminary reference 
procedure might serve as a mechanism for 
the national judiciary to influence domes-
tic public policy. Nonetheless, one should 
keep in mind that neither the ECJ’s nor 
the national courts’ jurisprudence is self-
implementing (Conant, 2002) at the level 
of public administration. The Alimanovic 
case has shown that local authorities and 
governments that are discontent with a rul-
ing, may reach for a different obstruction 
mechanism or revise domestic legislation, 
hence overturning judicial influence. 
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Sažetak
PRISTUP EUROPSKOG SUDA PRAVDE PREMA ZAHTJEVIMA EU MIGRANATA 
ZA SOCIJALNIM NAKNADAMA: PROCESNA ANALIZA SUDSKOG UTJECAJA 
NA SOCIJALNU POLITIKU NJEMAČKE
Mario Munta
Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Zagreb, Hrvatska
Cilj ovog rada je istražiti u kojoj mjeri Europski sud pravde (ESP) odluke o prethodnim 
pitanjima u području socijalnih naknada za ekonomski neaktivne migrante, državljane Eu-
ropske unije (EU), donosi strateški, a u kojoj se mjeri nacionalni sudovi u tim područjima 
pokoravaju odlukama ESP-a. Rad pri tome nastoji doprinijeti boljem razumijevanju utje-
caja sudstva na javne politike putem procedure prethodnih pitanja EU-a. Kako je područje 
socijalne politike izrazito konfliktno, ovaj rad pretpostavlja da će aktivnosti ESP-a u tome 
području u najvećoj mjeri odražavati strateško balansiranje između dublje EU integracije 
putem sudskih praksi i poštivanja nacionalnih (fiskalnih) interesa i nadležnosti. Autor po-
seže za interguvernmentalnom teorijskom perspektivom racionalnog izbora i primjenjuje 
ju na primjeru Njemačke gdje su tri nedavna slučaja pristupa socijalnim naknadama (tj. 
posebnim nekontributivnim davanjima) upućena ESP-u na odlučivanje o prethodnim pita-
njima (Dano C-333/13, Alimanović C-67/15 i García-Nieto C-299/14). Zaključci se temelje 
na rekonstrukciji političkih okolnosti, prethodne sudske prakse ESP-a, priloženih obrazlo-
ženja u slučajevima te konačne presude nacionalnih sudova.
Ključne riječi: EU migranti; sustav socijalnih naknada; Europski sud pravde; prethod-
na pitanja; Alimanović; Dano; García-Nieto.
